Total tightness implies Nash-solvability for three-person game forms  by Boros, Endre et al.
Discrete Mathematics 312 (2012) 1436–1443
Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirect
Discrete Mathematics
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/disc
Total tightness implies Nash-solvability for three-person game forms
Endre Boros a, Ondřej Čepek b,c,∗, Vladimir Gurvich a
a RUTCOR, Rutgers University, 640 Bartholomew Road, Piscataway, NJ 08854, USA
b Department of Theoretical Informatics, Charles University, Malostranské nám. 25, 118 00 Praha 1, Czech Republic
c Institute of Finance and Administration - VŠFS, Estonská 500, 100 00, Praha 10, Czech Republic
a r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:
Received 10 July 2011
Received in revised form 28 December 2011
Accepted 31 December 2011
Available online 30 January 2012
Keywords:
Nash equilibrium
Nash-solvability
Totally tight
Acyclic
Dominance-solvable game forms
a b s t r a c t
It was recently shown that every totally tight two-person game form is acyclic, dominance-
solvable, and hence, Nash-solvable too. In this paper, we exhibit an example showing that
the first two implications fail for the three-person (n = 3) game forms. Yet, we show that
the last one (total tightness implies Nash-solvability) still holds for n = 3 leaving the case
n > 3 open.
© 2012 Published by Elsevier B.V.
1. Introduction
An n-person game form is a mapping g : X = X1 × · · · × Xn → A, where Xi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, is the set of strategies of player
i, and A is the set of outcomes. We will restrict our attention to finite game forms only, that is, we will assume that the sets
Xi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and A are all finite. Moreover, let ui : A → R, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, be a real valued utility function (sometimes called
payoff function) of player i, where ui(a) is interpreted as the profit of player i if the outcome a ∈ A is realized. The vector
u = (u1, . . . , un) is called a utility profile and the pair (g, u) then defines a normal form n-person game.
In fact, in this paper, we are not interested in the numerical values that the utility functions assign to the individual
outcomes. The only important information carried by a utility function, for the concepts studied in this paper, is the relative
order of the outcomes. For outcomes a, b ∈ A, we say that a player i (strictly) prefers b to a and write a≤i b (respectively,
a < b) when ui(a) ≤ ui(b) (respectively, ui(a) < ui(b)). If both a≤i b and b≤i a hold (that is, ui(a) = ui(b)), we write a=i b.
Of course, by definition, both relations <i and ≤i are transitive; moreover, ≤i is complete, that is, any two outcomes are
comparable.
Similar to the case of utilities, we use the preference orders of individual players to define a preference profile as a vector
p = (≤1, . . . ,≤n). Then, a game is defined by a pair (g, p).
An n-person game form g can be thought of as an n-dimensional matrix with entries from the set A. In accordance with
this terminology, a vector x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ X is called a strategy profile (or just a profile, for short). A profile can be thought
of as a position in the matrix, and g(x) is then called an entry of the game form g , that is, an entry is an outcome for a given
profile. A set of all profiles xwith identical xj ∈ Xj for all j ≠ i (that is, only the i-th components may differ) will be referred
to as a line in direction i. A set of all profiles x with identical xi ∈ Xi will be referred to as a hyperplane (perpendicular to
the direction i). Using this matrix terminology, we will also say that profile x dominates profile y in direction i if g(y)<i g(x)
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and ∀j ≠ i : yj = xj (both profiles are on the same line in direction i). Finally, we say that profile x is non-dominated in
direction i if g(y)≤i g(x) holds for all y such that ∀j ≠ i : yj = xj, i.e., if it is non-dominated on the line in direction i that
‘‘goes through’’ x.
Given a game (g, p), a profile x = (x1, . . . , xn), is called a Nash equilibrium (NE, for short) if x is non-dominated in all
directions, that is, if
g(x1, . . . , xi−1, yi, xi+1, . . . , xn)≤i g(x1, . . . , xi−1, xi, xi+1, . . . , xn) for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and yi ∈ Xi.
This means than no player can achieve a strictly better outcome (according to his preferences) by changing his strategy
if all other players keep their strategies unchanged.
A game form g is called Nash solvable if for every preference profile p the game (g, p) has an NE.
Quite obviously, given a game, it is not difficult to test in polynomial time whether it has an NE simply by inspecting all
strategy profiles (checking if a given profile is an NE can be done in linear time with respect to |X1| + · · · + |Xn| and the
number of entries to check is |X1| × · · · × |Xn|). On the other hand, given a game form, it seems not to be easy to verify its
Nash solvability. The number of all possible preference profiles to consider is (|A|!)n which gets computationally out of hand
already for moderate values of |A| and n. Unfortunately, no significantly faster algorithm than the brute force one is known
for testing Nash solvability in the general n player setting. The above observation means that it is quite interesting to derive
sufficient conditions for Nash solvability of game forms, especially those conditions that are easy to verify.
Let us for a while concentrate on the two-person case (n = 2), which is the most studied one. In [2], the following six
classes of game forms were considered: tight (T ), totally tight (TT ), Nash-solvable (NS), dominance-solvable (DS), acyclic
(AC), and assignable (AS). A two-person game form g : X1×X2 → A is totally tight (TT ) if every 2× 2 subform of g (which is
a two-dimensional matrix in this case) contains a constant line (row or column). More precisely, let us call g ′ : X ′1×X ′2 → A
to be a 2× 2 restriction of g if X ′1 = {x1, x′1} ⊆ X1 and X ′2 = {x2, x′2} ⊆ X2 are 2-element subsets of X1 and X2. Then g is TT if
and only if for every 2× 2 restriction g ′ of g we have
g ′(x1, x2) = g ′(x1, x′2), or g ′(x1, x2) = g ′(x′1, x2), or g ′(x′1, x′2) = g ′(x′1, x2), or g ′(x′1, x′2) = g ′(x1, x′2).
We defer the definitions of DS and AC to Section 5, and for the definitions of T and AS we refer the reader to [2], where more
details on all six classes can be found. It was shown that for the two-person case the following implications hold
AS ⇐ TT ⇔ AC ⇒ DS ⇒ NS ⇔ T . (1)
In fact, the last three implications, DS ⇒ NS ⇔ T , were obtained long ago; see [12,13,5,6,8], respectively. Furthermore,
AC ⇒ TT is obvious; see [10] or [2]. The remaining three implications TT ⇒ AS, TT ⇒ DS, and TT ⇒ AC constitute the
main results of [2] (note also that TT ⇒ DS together with the trivial relationship AC ⇒ TT implies AC ⇒ DS as stated above
in (1)). The first two of them were conjectured by Kukushkin ([10] and private communications); the last one was proven
in [10] and independently in [2]. All three easily result from the recursive characterization of the TT two-person game forms
obtained in [2]. Let us alsomention that TT ⇒ NS can be derived from Shapley’s theorem [14], although it was not explicitly
claimed there, as [14] deals with the zero-sum games and their saddle points, rather than with game forms and NS.
Out of the four sufficient conditions for NS in the two-player case (that is, TT , AC,DS, and T , the last one being not only
sufficient but also necessary), only the property of TT is known to be testable in polynomial time with respect to the size of
the two-dimensional matrix that defines the input game form. In fact, this task is trivial, since every 2 × 2 subform can be
inspected in constant time, and there are only O(|X1|2 · |X2|2) different 2 × 2 subforms. (In contrast, verifying directly the
definitions of DS or AC requires exponential time. Of course one can verify the AC property efficiently using the TT ⇔ AC
relation).
Testing T is more interesting. It was shown in [6] that this task is equivalent to testing whether certain two monotone
Boolean functions associated with the game form constitute a dual pair. Thus, the complexity of testing T is the same as the
complexity of dualization for monotone Boolean functions, which can be done (see [4]) in quasi-polynomial (that is, N logN ,
where N is the size of the input) time.
It should be also mentioned that, except for those given in (1), no other implications hold between the considered six
classes of game forms; the corresponding examples, for all invalid implications, were given in [2]. Thus, the two-person case
is fully studied with respect to the considered six classes, while much less is known for general, n-person, game forms.
Moulin [13] proved that for every n,DS ⇒ NS and DS ⇒ T . Yet, tightness and Nash-solvability are no longer related,
that is, both implications in NS ⇔ T fail already for n = 3. In [6],⇐ was disproved, while⇒ mistakenly claimed; then,
in [8] it was shown that both implications fail for n ≥ 3.
Remark 1. For n person game forms, Nash-solvability results from tightness and the following extra assumption. An n-
person game form g : X1×· · · Xn → A is called rectangular if for each outcome a ∈ A, its pre-image g−1(a) is a box of X , that
is, g−1(a) = X ′1 × · · · X ′n, where X ′i ⊆ Xi for i = 1, . . . , n. It was mentioned in Remark 3 of [6] that tightness is sufficient for
Nash-solvability of a rectangular n-person game form g and, moreover, g is the normal form of a positional n-person game
form modeled by a tree if and only if g is tight and rectangular. The last statement was proven in [7]; see also [9].
Remark 2. It is worth mentioning that game forms are a general concept. They can be viewed as discrete functions of n
discrete arguments, which is a natural extension of the concept of Boolean functions. Interpretations of game forms in
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terms of games (or voting) theory are important but the same concept appears in many other contexts. In fact, among the
six properties of game forms considered earlier in this section five are related to games, while assignability is not; it can be
interpreted as a separability property; see [1].
The fact that T is no longer a sufficient condition for NS for n > 2 (if no additional assumptions are made about g , as in
Remark 1) also dashes any hopes to generalize the dualization procedure in some cleverway to obtain an effectively testable
sufficient conditions forNS in the case ofmore than two players. Some other relations are known for n > 2. Of course, all the
negative results (non-implications) carry over from the n = 2 case. On the positive side, acyclicity implies Nash-solvability
(AC ⇒ NS) for any n, which trivially follows from the definitions of AC and NS (see Section 5 for the definition of AC).
The TT property can be generalized from the two-person case to n-person game form for n > 2. We will recall this
definition introduced in [1] in the next section. It is known that total tightness implies assignability (TT ⇒ AS) for n = 3
(see [3] for a sketch of the proof). On the other hand, in this case total tightness implies neither acyclicity nor dominance-
solvability. Both TT ⇒ AC and TT ⇒ DS fail already for n = 3, as shownby a single example given in Section 5.Moreover, the
same example disproves a recent conjecture of [10] stating that a game form is acyclic if every subformof it is Nash solvable.1
As the main result of this paper, we prove (in Section 4) the following theorem which provides a sufficient condition for
Nash-solvability testable in polynomial time.
Theorem 3. Total tightness implies Nash-solvability for three-person game forms.
Whether TT ⇒ NS for n > 3 remains an open question.
2. Total tightness for more than two players
Let I = {1, . . . , n} be a finite set of players whose subsets K ⊆ I are called coalitions. Given an n-person game form
g : X → A and a partition I = K ∪ K of the players into two complementary coalitions, the two-person game form
gK : XK ×XK → A is defined in the following way. The strategies of the first player are the elements of the Cartesian product
XK =i∈K Xi and the strategies of the second player are the elements of the Cartesian product XK =i∈K Xi. Naturally, for
xK ∈ XK and xK ∈ XK we define gK (xK , xK ) = g(x) where the strategy profile x originates from xK and xK by concatenating
them and reordering the coordinates according to the X1, . . . , Xn order.
An n-person game form g is called totally tight if gK is TT for all K ⊆ I . Furthermore, g is called weakly totally tight (WTT)
if gK is TT for all K ⊆ I such that |K | = 1. Note that for a WTT game form g the entries in any 2 × 2 submatrix of g{i} can
be geometrically thought of as the four intersections of two arbitrary distinct lines in direction iwith two arbitrary distinct
(n − 1)-dimensional hyperplanes perpendicular to direction i. Let us also remark that although the two concepts (TT and
WTT ) coincide whenever n ≤ 3 (and hence there is no difference for the main result of the paper which deals with n = 3),
it makes sense to differentiate these two concepts in the next section which assumes only WTT while its results are valid
for all n.
3. Structural properties of minimal game forms
In this section, we shall consider the general n player case and assume thatWTT does not implyNS. Thus we shall assume
that there exist game forms which areWTT but not NS, and in particular we will be interested in those game forms which
are minimal with this property. To this end let g : X → A be a game formwhich is assumed to beWTT but not NS. Introduce
di = |Xi|, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and think of g as a d1 × d2 × · · · × dn matrix. Moreover, let us assume that g is minimal with the
assumed property, i.e. that every proper submatrix of g is NS (such a proper submatrix is of courseWTT as this property is
hereditary). Finally, since g is assumed not to be NS, there exists at least one preference profile p, such that the game (g, p)
has no NE. Let us for the rest of this section fix one such p.
We shall derive in this section several relatively strong properties which are valid for g . In the next section, we will then
show that such properties cannot be fulfilled if n = 3, proving that in this case no such game form exists, and hence showing
WTT ⇒ NS for three players (which is in this case the same as TT ⇒ NS).
Lemma 4. Game form g contains no constant hyperplane of dimension n− 1.
Proof. Let us by contradiction assume that g contains a constant hyperplane H of dimension n− 1 and let g ′ originate from
g by deleting H . By minimality of g we get that g ′ is NS and thus it contains an NE x (with respect to p). Now there are two
cases to consider:
1. either x is an NE of g
2. or x is dominated by some y in H which implies that such a y is an NE of g .
In any case g has an NE with respect to p contradicting our assumptions. 
1 This observation was pointed to us by an anonymous referee.
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Lemma 5. Let us consider an arbitrary player i, the corresponding direction i in game form g, and the di hyperplanes
H1,H2, . . . ,Hdi of dimension n − 1 perpendicular to this direction. Then di ≤

j≠i dj holds, and there are di distinct lines
ℓ1, ℓ2, . . . , ℓdi in direction i and di pairwise different outcomes a1, a2, . . . , adi such that
(a) for every j, we have aj = g(yj) for the strategy profile yj at the intersection of Hj with ℓj, and
(b) aj is the unique maximum on ℓj with respect to the preferences of player i in preference profile p, and
(c) for every j ≠ k either aj<i ak or aj<i ak.
Proof. Let g j originate from g by deletingHj. Byminimality of g we get that g j isNS and thus it contains an NE xj with respect
to p. The only way to prevent the strategy profile xj from being an NE of g is that the line in direction i containing xj (let us
denote this line by ℓj) intersects Hj in some yj which strictly dominates xj with respect to the preferences of player i in p.
Since yj strictly dominates xj and xj is non-dominated on ℓj in g j, we get that aj = g(yj) is a unique maximum on ℓj in g with
respect to the preferences of player i. This finishes a proof of (a) and (b).
Let us consider lines ℓj and ℓk for j ≠ k. Since ℓj attains its unique maximum in Hj and ℓk attains its unique maximum in
Hk, these two lines cannot be the same. Thus the lines ℓ1, ℓ2, . . . , ℓdi are pairwise distinct, which proves that di ≤

j≠i dj
because the right hand side is equal to the number of all lines in direction i.
To prove (c) let us by contradiction assume that aj=i ak holds for some j ≠ k. Let us consider the four entries in the
intersections of ℓj and ℓk with Hj and Hk. Let us denote by c the outcome in the intersection of ℓj with Hk and by c ′ the
outcome in the intersection of ℓk with Hj. Since aj is a unique maximum on ℓj we get c<i aj=i ak and since ak is a unique
maximum on ℓk we get c ′<i ak=i aj. However, this implies c ∉ {aj, ak} and c ′ ∉ {aj, ak} and so the 2× 2 matrix defined by
these four entries (which is a submatrix of the game form g{i} as defined in Section 2) is not TT contradicting the assumption
that g isWTT. Hence either aj<i ak or ak<i ajmust holdwhich of course also implies that aj and ak are different outcomes. 
Since the unique maxima are pairwise different they can be strictly linearly ordered with respect to the preferences of
player i. Henceforth, we assume each player’s strategy set to be ordered accordingly and numbered 1, . . . , di (which can be
geometrically thought of as having the hyperplanes perpendicular to the direction of player i ordered in such a way that
a1<i a2<i · · ·<i adi holds for every player i). Now we are ready to prove the main theorem of this subsection which quite
strongly specifies how the game form g must look like.
Theorem 6. Let us consider player i, the corresponding direction in game formg, and di hyperplanes H1,H2, . . . ,Hdi of dimension
n− 1 perpendicular to direction i. Then there are di distinct lines ℓ1, ℓ2, . . . , ℓdi in direction i and di pairwise different outcomes
a1<i a2<i · · ·<i adi such that
(a) for every j, 1 ≤ j ≤ di, outcome aj is in the j-th entry on ℓj, aj is the unique maximum on ℓj with respect to the preferences
of player i, and
(b) every line ℓ in direction i contains outcomes (a1, a2, . . . , aj, b, b, . . . , b) in this order in hyperplanes H1, . . . ,Hdi for some
outcome b = bℓ dependent on ℓ and some index j, 0 ≤ j ≤ di.
In particular, for some lines ℓ we may have j = 0, that is, ℓ is a constant line (b, b, . . . , b). Furthermore, the special lines
ℓ1, ℓ2, . . . , ℓdi have the property that ℓj, 1 ≤ j ≤ di, is a line (a1, a2, . . . , aj, b, b, . . . , b) for some outcome b<i aj.
Proof. The fact that there exist di distinct lines ℓ1, ℓ2, . . . , ℓdi and di distinct values a1<i a2<i · · ·<i adi such that aj is the
unique maximum on ℓj which lies in Hj (and thus is the j-th entry on ℓj) follows from Lemma 5 implying (a).
Now let us show that ℓj contains outcomes (a1, a2, . . . , aj) in this order in hyperplanesH1,H2, . . . ,Hj. Let us fix j and pick
1 ≤ k < j arbitrarily (if such a k exists, the statement is trivial for j = 1). Now consider the four entries in the intersections
of ℓj and ℓk with Hk and Hj. Let us denote by c the outcome in the intersection of ℓj with Hk and by c ′ the outcome in the
intersection of ℓk withHj. Since ak is a uniquemaximumon ℓk and ak<i aj, we get c ′ ∉ {ak, aj}. Since aj is a uniquemaximum
on ℓj we get c ≠ aj. However, now to make the 2× 2 matrix defined by these four entries TT , we must have c = ak.
To prove (b) let us consider a line ℓ containing outcomes (a1, . . . , aj, b, . . .), where the outcome b in position j + 1 for
some 0 ≤ j ≤ di − 2 is the first one to differ from aj+1 (the statement is trivial if j ≥ di − 1). We shall prove that every
entry in ℓwith the i coordinate greater than j+ 1 is occupied by b. To this end let us fix k > j+ 1 arbitrarily and assume by
contradiction that position k in ℓ is occupied by some c ≠ b. Now consider the four entries in the intersections of ℓ and ℓk
with Hj+1 and Hk. These entries contain outcomes b and c in ℓ and aj+1 and ak in ℓk. We have b ≠ c, b ≠ aj+1, and aj+1 ≠ ak,
and so c = ak must hold to make the 2× 2 matrix defined by these four entries TT . On the other hand, replacing the role of
ℓk by ℓj+1 (i.e. considering the intersections of ℓ and ℓj+1 with Hj+1 and Hk) we get four outcomes b and c in ℓ and aj+1 and
c ′ in ℓj+1, where c ′<i aj+1 because aj+1 is the unique maximum on line ℓj+1. But now b ≠ c, b ≠ aj+1, and aj+1 ≠ c ′, and
so c = c ′ must hold to make the 2× 2 matrix defined by these four entries TT . This gives the desired contradiction because
we have c ′<i aj+1<i ak and so c = ak and c = c ′ cannot hold simultaneously. Note also that b ≠ aj+1 implies ℓ ∉ {ℓj+1, ℓk}
and so the proof works also for ℓ = ℓj. 
Theorem 6 immediately implies a simple corollary.
Corollary 7. For every j, 1 ≤ j ≤ di, the hyperplane Hj contains at least one outcome aj which is the unique maximum on its
corresponding line perpendicular to Hj.
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Theorem 6 works only with the lines in the direction which corresponds to player i but since iwas picked arbitrarily the
same statement is true for every direction. Now we are ready to disprove an existence of game form g for the case of three
players.
4. Proof of Theorem 3
Let us consider the three player case with players A, B, C . Let us slightly change the notation. Let the minimal totally
tight and not Nash-solvable game form g have dimensions dA × dB × dC (we may assume dimensions at least 2 × 2 × 2
since reducing any dimension to 1 results in a two-person game form for which TT ⇒ NS is known to hold, and hence no
counterexample exists); let the hyperplanes perpendicular to the direction of player A beHA1 , . . . ,H
A
dA
(similarlyHB1 , . . . ,H
B
dB
for player B and HC1 , . . . ,H
C
dC
for player C); let the preferences of player A among the outcomes be ordered by relation <A
(similarly<B for player B and<C for player C); let the uniquemaxima on the perpendicular lines in hyperplanesHA1 , . . . ,H
A
dA
guaranteed by Theorem 6 be a1<A a2<A · · ·<A adA (b1<B b2<B · · ·<B bdB for player B and c1<C c2<C · · ·<C cdC for player
C). Let us also adopt the following terminology: if a hyperplane HAj contains an entry e ≠ aj then by Theorem 6 all entries
in the intersections of line ℓ perpendicular to HAj with the hyperplanes H
A
j+1, . . . ,H
A
dA
must also be e, and we say that entry
eA-propagates (similarly B-propagates for e ≠ bj in HBj and C-propagates for e ≠ cj in HCj ).
In order to be able to refer to particular entries in g , we adopt a vector notation, where the strategy profile (x, y, z) is the
intersection of HAx ,H
B
y , and H
C
z . This notation can be extended to lines and hyperplanes. The line in the direction of player
A denoted by (∗, y, z) is the intersection of HBy , and HCz (lines in directions of players B and C are denoted similarly), and
hyperplane HAx can be denoted as (x, ∗, ∗) (similarly for HBy , and HCz ).
Nowwe shall go through a rather tedious case and subcase analysis, where in every subcasewe shall arrive at conclusions
which contradict the existence of the game form g . The contradiction always rests in deriving one of the following three
facts:
• g contains a Nash equilibrium (NE for short) contradicting the choice of g , or
• g contains a constant hyperplane (CH for short) contradicting Lemma 4, or
• hyperplane HAj for some 1 ≤ j ≤ dA contains no outcome aj which is a unique maximum on its line in direction A,
contradicting Corollary 7.
The first branching is done based on the mutual relations of outcomes a1, b1, c1. Note that the arguments used in the first
two cases (all three outcomes identical and all three outcomes different) can be easily generalized to n player game forms
for arbitrary n, while the treatment of the last case (two outcomes identical and one outcome different) relies heavily on the
three-dimensionality of the game form g .
Case I (all identical): a1 = b1 = c1
In this case, we have just two possibilities. Either all three lines (1, 1, ∗), (1, ∗, 1), (∗, 1, 1) consist only of outcome
a1 = b1 = c1 in which case (1, 1, 1) is an NE (which is a contradiction), or there is an outcome e different from a1 = b1 = c1
on one of these lines. Since this case is symmetric, we may without loss of generality assume that e is in position (j, 1, 1) for
some index j. However, using Theorem 6 the line (j, ∗, 1) in the direction of player Bmust be a constant e line (eB-propagates
since it differs from b1), which in turn implies that for every k the line (j, k, ∗) in the direction of player C must be a constant
e line (eC-propagates since it differs from c1). This means that (j, ∗, ∗) is a CH which is again a contradiction.
Case II (all different): a1 ≠ b1 ≠ c1 ≠ a1
Consider the outcome e in position (1, 1, 1). Clearly, e must be different from (at least) two outcomes from the set
{a1, b1, c1}. Due to symmetry, we may without loss of generality assume that e ∉ {b1, c1}. By an identical argument as
in the previous case (where we set j = 1) we get that (1, ∗, ∗) is a CH.
Case III (one different): a1 ≠ b1 = c1
Consider the outcome e in position (1, 1, 1). If e ≠ b1 = c1 then the argument of Case II can be repeated and (1, ∗, ∗) is
a CH. Thus let us in the rest of this case assume that the outcome in position (1, 1, 1) is b1 = c1. This also implies that this
entry A-propagates and so (∗, 1, 1) is a constant b1 line.
Now consider the outcome f in position (1, 2, 1). If f ∉ {a1, c1} then f both A-propagates and C-propagates and so
(∗, 2, ∗) is CH and if f = c1 = b1 then since b1 ≠ b2 we get that b1B-propagates and so (1, ∗, 1) is a constant b1 line.
However, b1 ≠ a1 now implies that each such b1A-propagates and thus (∗, ∗, 1) is a CH. Therefore, we may in the rest of
this case assume f = a1 andmoreover since this entry C-propagates we get that (1, 2, ∗) is a constant a1 line. By symmetry,
also (1, ∗, 2) is a constant a1 line.
Furthermore, consider the outcome h in position (1, 3, 1). If h ≠ b1 = c1 then it C-propagates and hence h = a1 must
hold, since we already know that the entry (1, 3, 2) is a1. However, now either a1 in position (1, 2, 1) or a1 in position
(1, 3, 1) B-propagates as a1 cannot be simultaneously equal to both b2 and b3. If h = b1 = c1 then this entry B-propagates
since b1 ≠ b3. If we summarize these observations we get that the (1, ∗, 1) line is either ℓa = (b1, a1, a1, . . . , a1) or
ℓb = (b1, a1, b1, . . . , b1), and the same is true by symmetry for the (1, 1, ∗) line.
Now we will branch again, this time based on the relation of outcome a1 with respect to outcomes b2, c2.
Case A (equal to both): a1 = b2 = c2
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Note that in this case b1<B b2 = a1 and also c1<C c2 = a1 and hence a1 dominates b1 = c1 in both directions in the
hyperplane (1, ∗, ∗). Let us distinguish two cases.
1. If the (1, ∗, 1) line is ℓa = (b1, a1, a1, . . . , a1) (or the (1, 1, ∗) line is ℓa = (b1, a1, a1, . . . , a1)) then each such a1C-
propagates (or each such a1B-propagates). In either case, it follows that the (1, ∗, ∗) = HA1 hyperplane contains only a1
and b1 entries and hence the unique a1 maximum in HA1 guaranteed by Corollary 7 is an NE.
2. If both (1, ∗, 1) and (1, 1, ∗) lines are ℓb = (b1, a1, b1, . . . , b1) thenHA1 may contain also other entries than a1 and b1 and
we have to proceed differently. Consider the entry a1 in position (1, 2, 2). Since both (1, 2, ∗) and (1, ∗, 2) are constant
a1 lines, the (1, 2, 2) entry is an NE unless it is dominated by some e (such that a1<A e) in the direction of player A. Note
that such emust be in position (2, 2, 2) because a1<A a2 and so every non-dominating entry in position (2, 2, 2)would
A-propagate leaving the entry a1 in position (1, 2, 2) non-dominated. However, a1<A e implies e ≠ a1 = b2 = c2 and
so e both B-propagates and C propagates. Thus HA2 must contain e everywhere except in the (2, 1, ∗) and (2, ∗, 1) lines,
which in turn implies that the only candidates for the unique a1 maximum in HA1 are the positions (1, 2, 1) and (1, 1, 2)
(every other a1 entry in HA1 is dominated by one of the e entries in H
A
2 ). But now, such a unique a1 maximum is an NE.
Case B (equal to one): a1 = b2 ≠ c2
Due to symmetry we may without a loss of generality consider the case a1 = b2 ≠ c2 (the case a1 = c2 ≠ b2 is
symmetric). The fact a1 ≠ c2 implies that the (1, 1, ∗) line is ℓa = (b1, a1, a1, . . . , a1) and each a1 in ℓaB-propagates.
This means that HA1 hyperplane must contain a1 everywhere except in the (1, ∗, 1) line (which may still be either ℓa =
(b1, a1, a1, . . . , a1) or ℓb = (b1, a1, b1, . . . , b1)). Note that b1<B b2 = a1 and so if b1<C a1 holds then the unique a1
maximum is an NE. So we may assume that a1<C b1 and distinguish the following two subcases.
1. Assume that the entry in position (2, 2, 1) is b1 = c1. We may moreover assume that every entry e in the (2, 2, ∗) line
satisfies a1<A e (in particular a1<A b1) since otherwise the corresponding a1 entry in (1, 2, ∗) is an NE. That means that
every entry in (2, 2, ∗) is different from a1 = b2 and hence it B-propagates (in particular the (2, ∗, 1) line is a constant
b1 line). The entries in (2, 1, ∗) are either the same as the corresponding entries in (2, 2, ∗) or they are equal to b1 (any
entry different from b1 must B-propagate). That means that HA2 consist completely of entries which dominate a1 entries
in HA1 contradicting the existence of unique a1 maximum in H
A
1 .
2. Assume that the entry in position (2, 2, 1) is e ≠ b1 = c1. This implies that eC-propagates making (2, 2, ∗) a constant e
line. Wemust have a1<A e since otherwise any a1 entry on the (1, 2, ∗) line is an NE. Therefore e ≠ a1 = b2 and so every
e on the (2, 2, ∗) line B-propagates making HA2 an ‘‘almost’’ constant e hyperplane, the only exception being the (2, 1, ∗)
line. Note that the B-propagation of e in position (2, 2, 1) forces the (1, ∗, 1) line to be ℓa = (b1, a1, a1, . . . , a1) and not
ℓb = (b1, a1, b1, . . . , b1) since b1 in position (1, 3, 1)would A-propagate (recall that a1 ≠ b1) contradicting e ≠ b1. Thus
we have a complete picture of HA1 : it is a constant a1 hyperplane with the exception of the b1 entry in position (1, 1, 1).
To get a complete picture of HA2 note that the (2, 1, ∗) line may contain only e and b1 entries as any entry different from
b1B-propagates into the constant e area of HA2 . In fact there are three possibilities how the (2, 1, ∗) line may look like.
(a) The (2, 1, ∗) line is (b1, e, . . . , e). In this case, there is no unique a1 maximum in HA1 as every a1 entry in HA1 is
dominated by e.
(b) The (2, 1, ∗) line is (b1, b1, . . . , b1). Here either e≤B b1, in which case the b1 entry in position (2, 1, 1) is an NE, or
b1<B e, in which case there are two more possibilities. Either e = a2, in which case the unique a2 maximum in HA2 is
an NE, or e ≠ a2, in which case every e entry in HA2A-propagates and therefore every such entry is an NE.
(c) The (2, 1, ∗) line is (b1, e, b1, . . . , b1). Note that in this case we may assume dC ≥ 3, since otherwise the (2, 1, ∗)
line is just (b1, e) which falls under case (a) above. The fact that e does not C-propagate implies e = c2, and hence
c1 = b1<C e. Moreover, we may assume that b1<A a1 since otherwise there is no unique a1 maximum in HA1 (every
entry inHA2 is either e or b1 andwe already know that a1<A e). The fact b1<C e implies that the e entry in the (2, 1, 2)
position is an NE unless e = a2 and it is dominated by some entry f in the direction of player A. Note that such f must
be in the (3, 1, 2) position since a non-dominating entry in (3, 1, 2)would have to be different from a3 and hence it
would A-propagate, leaving e non-dominated. Now on one handwe have that c2 = e<A f implies that fC-propagates
and so the entry in the (3, 1, 3) position is f . On the other hand, b1<A a1<A a2 implies that b1 in the (2, 1, 3) position
A-propagates and so the entry in the (3, 1, 3) position is b1. However, b1<A a1<A e<A f holds implying b1 ≠ f , which
is a contradiction.
Note that the above three cases are indeed the only possibilities of how the mixture of e and b1 entries on the (2, 1, ∗)
line may look like. If (2, 1, 2) is b1 = c1 (implying b1 ≠ c2) then this b1 entry C-propagates resulting in the second case.
If (2, 1, 2) is e then either e ≠ c2 and this entry C-propagates (which is the first case), or e = c2 in which case depending
on the (2, 1, 3) entry we get again the first case ((2, 1, 3) is e ≠ c3) or the third case ((2, 1, 3) is b1 ≠ c3).
Case C (different from both): a1 ∉ {b2, c2}
The fact a1 ≠ c2 implies that the (1, 1, ∗) line is ℓa = (b1, a1, a1, . . . , a1) and each a1B-propagates. Similarly, a1 ≠ b2
implies that the (1, ∗, 1) line is ℓa = (b1, a1, a1, . . . , a1) and each a1C-propagates. Thus HA1 is a constant a1 hyperplane with
the exception of the b1 entry in position (1, 1, 1). If a1≤B b1 and a1≤C b1 hold simultaneously, then the b1 entry in position
(1, 1, 1) is an NE. If b1≤B a1 and b1≤C a1 hold simultaneously, then the unique a1 maximum in HA1 is an NE. This covers all
the cases in which there are strict inequalities ‘‘in the same direction’’ and/or at least one equality between a1 and b1. The
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remaining two possibilities when the strict inequalities go ‘‘in the opposite directions’’ are symmetric, so let us in the rest
of this case assume that b1<B a1 and a1<C b1. This implies that the unique a1 maximum in HA1 is an NE unless it appears in
the (1, 1, ∗) line. Let us distinguish two cases.
1. Let us assume that a1≤A b1. Let the unique a1 maximum in HA1 be in the (1, 1, i) position for some i > 1 and let e be
the entry in the (2, 1, i) position. Clearly, e<A a1 (since e is on a line with unique a1 maximum) and hence e<A a2 and
e<A b1. This implies that e both A-propagates and B-propagates which means that (∗, ∗, i) = HCi is an ‘‘almost’’ constant
e hyperplane except for the (1, ∗, i) constant a1 line. However, this means that any such a1 in the (1, j, i) position for
j > 1 is an NE.
2. Let us assume that b1<A a1. Let us denote theHA1 hyperplanewithout the (1, 1, ∗) line as region R1 and theHA2 hyperplane
without the (2, 1, ∗) line as region R2. Every a1 entry in R1 is an NE unless it is dominated by some entry e in the direction
of player A. Such emust be in R2 since a non-dominating entry in R2 would have to be different from a2 and hence it would
A-propagate, leaving the corresponding a1 in HA1 non-dominated. In particular, this means that R2 contains no b1 = c1
entry which in turn implies that every entry in the (2, j, 1) position for j > 1C-propagates creating a constant line in R2.
Therefore, R2 is fully specified by the (2, ∗, 1) line, which by Theorem 6 has the form (b1, b2, . . . , bi, e, . . . , e) for some
index i ≥ 1 and some outcome e ≠ bi. Now we can distinguish two cases.• If i ≥ 2 then every line in the direction of player B intersects R2 in at least two different entries and hence the (2, 1, ∗)
line must be a constant b1 line (any other entry would B-propagate). Hence every line in the direction of player B in
HA2 is a copy of (2, ∗, 1). Let f be the maximum element with respect to<B in (2, ∗, 1) (clearly either f = bi or f = e).
Now either f = a2 in which case the unique a2 maximum in HA2 is an NE, or f ≠ a2 in which case fA-propagates and
any f entry in HA2 is an NE.• If i = 1 then R2 is a constant e region and there are three possibilities how the (2, 1, ∗) line may look like, namely
(b1, e, . . . , e), or (b1, b1, . . . , b1), or (b1, e, b1, . . . , b1) by the same argument as in the last paragraph of Case B.
Moreover, note that in this case both hyperplane HA1 and the three forms of H
A
2 look exactly the same as in Case B,
Subcase 2. Also the assumptions onmutual relations of outcomes are the same (in particular the assumptions b1<A a1
and a1<A e) and hence the arguments from Case B, Subcase 2, paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) can be repeated word by
word here. The fact a1 = b2 valid in Case B and not valid in Case C is only used in Case B, Subcase 2 to show that HA2
contains e everywhere except on the (2, 1, ∗) line (i.e. to show that R2 is a constant e region), but it is never used in
(a), (b) and (c) once the form of HA2 is known.
Since the above case analysis covers all possible cases, this finishes the proof. 
5. On acyclicity and dominance solvability of n-person game forms
In this section, we present an example which shows that the implications TT ⇒ AC and TT ⇒ DS, which are valid for
2-person game forms, fail already for three players.
Remark 8. This example also disproves a recent conjecture of [10] stating that a game form is acyclic if every subform of it
is Nash solvable. Note that for games (not game forms) a similar statement was proved in [15]: a game need not be acyclic
if every subgame of it has an NE.2
Let us start with the definition of AC . An n-person game is defined by a game form g and a preference profile p. Given a
direction i and two profiles x and y such that xj = yj for every j ≠ i (i.e. both entries are on the same line in direction i), the
move from x to y is called an improving move in direction i if g(x)<i g(y) holds. A non-empty sequence of improving moves
which starts and ends in the same entry is called an improvement cycle of the game. Clearly, if a game has an improvement
cycle then it has one in which no two consecutive improving moves are in the same direction.
A game is called acyclic if it has no improvement cycle. Obviously, an acyclic game has a Nash equilibrium. Furthermore,
a game form g is called acyclic (AC) if the obtained game is acyclic for any preference profile p. Hence, AC ⇒ NS. In order to
show that a given game form g is not AC it suffices to show one particular preference profile p such that the resulting game
(g, p) has an improvement cycle.
Fig. 1 shows a 3-person game form g of dimensions 3× 2× 2 for players {A, B, C} and three outcomes {a, b, c}. Player A
chooses hyperplanes (strategies) perpendicular to left–right lines, B chooses hyperplanes perpendicular to up-down lines,
and C chooses hyperplanes perpendicular to front-back lines. It is easy to verify that g is TT by checking all 2×2 submatrices
of the game forms g{A}, g{B}, and g{C}. On the other hand, if we set b<A c<A a for player A, a<B c<B b for player B, and
c<C a<C b for player C , then the resulting game contains an improvement cycle of length seven, which ismarked by arrows
on the edges in Fig. 1. Thus, TT does not imply AC for n = 3.
Remark 9. The concept of acyclicity can be naturally generalized by replacing individual improvements by coalitional ones.
Very recently (see Theorem 4.2 in [11]) it was shown than an n-person game form is coalitional acyclic if and only if it is
either dictatorial (there exists a single player that determines the outcome, i.e. the game form consists of parallel constant
hyperplanes) or TT with just two outcomes.
2 This remark was pointed to us by an anonymous referee.
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Fig. 1. A game form g contradicting TT ⇒ AC and TT ⇒ DS.
Now let us define DS. Again, let us consider an n-person game defined by a game form g and a preference profile p. Given
a direction i and two hyperplanes Hj and Hk perpendicular to direction i (these correspond to two different strategies of
player i), we say that Hk is dominated by Hj if for every line ℓ in direction i (or in other words, for any fixed set of strategies
of the remaining players) the intersection of ℓwith Hk (let us call this profile y) does not dominate the intersection of ℓwith
Hj (let us call this profile x), i.e. if g(y)≤i g(x). Let us consider a game form g ′ which we get from g by deleting a dominated
hyperplane. Then we say that a game (g ′, p) was obtained from the game (g, p) by a reduction step. We say that a game
is dominance solvable if there exists a sequence of reduction steps which reduces the game to a game with a single entry.
Finally, a game form g is dominance solvable (DS) if the game (g, p) is dominance solvable for every preference profile p.
Similarly as in the AC case this means that, in order to show that a given game form g is not DS, it suffices to show one
particular preference profile p such that the resulting game (g, p) is not dominance solvable.
Again consider game form g from Fig. 1 and the same player preferences as before. It is easy to see that neither of the two
hyperplanes perpendicular to direction B dominates the other, since there are arcs in both directions on the improvement
cycle in between these two hyperplanes. The same is true for the two hyperplanes perpendicular to direction C . Thus the
only reduction step possible is to remove the leftmost hyperplane perpendicular to direction A which is dominated by the
middle hyperplane perpendicular to direction A. However, it is easy to verify that the resulting 2 × 2 × 2 game form g ′
together with the player preferences now define a game in which no reduction step is possible. This proves that the original
game is not dominance solvable, and thus TT does not imply DS for n = 3.
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